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JUDICIAL PANEL: TENNESSEE LEGAL 
REFORM FROM A JUDICIAL STANDPOINT 
 
Featuring: 
JUSTICE CORNELIA A. CLARK,*  
SENIOR JUDGE MARTHA CRAIG DAUGHTREY,**  
&  
JUSTICE WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR.*** 
Moderated by Professor Jeffrey Omar Usman 
Moderator: I would like to begin our discussion today with considering the 
need to balance stability with change in the law and thinking about the 
evolution of the common law in particular. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
asserted that it is not an adequate justification for a law’s continuing 
existence that it is long-standing: “It is revolting to have no better reason 
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.”1 
Some legal philosophers have countered with noting the importance of 
consistency in the law. Judge Daughtrey, you served on the Tennessee 
Supreme Court that decided McIntyre v. Balentine.2 That decision is one of 
the most significant changes in Tennessee’s common law with the court 
                                                 
 *  Justice Cornelia A. Clark was appointed to the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
September 2005 and was elected to a full eight-year term in August 2006. On September 1, 
2010, she was sworn in as chief justice, becoming the second woman in Tennessee history to 
serve in that role. Prior to her appointment to the Supreme Court, Justice Clark served as 
director of the Administrative Office of the Courts for six years. Clark was appointed circuit 
court judge of the 21st Judicial District in October 1989. She was elected to a full eight-year 
term in 1990, and was re-elected in 1998. 
 **  Senior Judge Martha Craig Daughtrey served as a judge on the Tennessee Court of 
Criminal Appeals from 1975 through 1990, and as an associate justice on the Tennessee 
Supreme Court from 1990 through 1993. She was the first woman on both the Tennessee 
Court of Criminal Appeals and the Tennessee Supreme Court. In 1993 President Bill Clinton 
appointed Daughtrey to serve as a circuit judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit. 
She became the first Tennessee woman to be appointed to the Sixth Circuit. 
 ***  Justice William C. Koch, Jr. was appointed to the Tennessee Supreme Court in 
June 2007. Prior to joining the Supreme Court, Justice Koch spent 23 years on the Tennessee 
Court of Appeals. He served as presiding judge of the Middle Section of that court from 
2003 to 2007. 
 1. Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897). 
 2. 833 S.W.2d 52 (Tenn. 1992). 
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transitioning from a contributory negligence to a comparative fault 
approach. How did you know it was time for significant change in the 
common law? 
 
Judge Daughtrey: It was pretty obvious because the Court, before I came 
on the Court, had been repeatedly running into requests from lawyers to 
make that change. And the members of the court would time after time 
decline the request and defer to the Legislature. I am not sure why they 
thought the Legislature was the appropriate reformer in that sense, because 
it was judge-made law in the beginning. I guess they thought that there was 
some sort of political weight there that should come before a democratic 
body. People got tired of waiting. The lawyers got tired of waiting. 
Eventually we got a new Court in 1990. While there were two members of 
the new Court of 1990 who had previously been on the Supreme Court, 
there were three of us who were new at that point and convinced that 
waiting for the Legislature any longer might last another fifty or hundred 
years.3 That was the reason for deciding it was time to do it, frankly. That 
was the impetus. 
 
Moderator: Justice Clark, when you arrive at one of those circumstances 
where there is a change being pressed in the common law, how do you 
balance stability versus a need to change? 
 
Justice Clark: I think it is pretty difficult. And I think it requires almost a 
case-to-case evaluation. The examples that come immediately to my mind 
in the eight years I have been on the Court have really had more to do with 
technology. Changes in technology can sometimes drive a need to change. 
One of the issues I think about is also the admission of expert testimony on 
eyewitness identification. Criminal defense lawyers had been advocating 
that there are issues in how persons make identifications when they are 
eyewitnesses to a crime, that there are scientifically demonstrable problems 
with eyewitness identification, particularly cross-racial identification. 
Expert testimony about those problems had generally been rejected in 
Tennessee and many other states for a long time. As recently as the year 
2000 in State v. Coley, 4 we had said that such testimony had not yet 
reached the level of scientific validity that made it admissible under our 
Rules, 701, 702, 703.5 And yet, eventually in a case called State v. 
Copeland, the Supreme Court changed its mind, and in doing so cited the 
advances, not specifically in technology, but in the peer reviewed and peer-
tested studies that had been conducted and in the additional evidence that 
                                                 
 3. For discussion of the Tennessee Supreme Court’s makeup during this period see 
generally Daniel J. Foley, Tennessee Supreme Court: A Statistical Analysis of an Ideological 
Shift After the 1990 Election, 64 TENN. L. REV. 155 (1996). 
 4. 32 S.W.3d 831, 838 (Tenn. 2000). 
 5. Tenn. R. Evid. 701; Tenn. R. Evid. 702; Tenn. R. Evid. 703. 
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had been generated that made it much more difficult to maintain the status 
quo.6 There were still limitations that were set, and there is still specific 
expertise that is required if someone is going to be granted the right to 
testify in a trial. But that is certainly one area where over time things 
change, and what is accepted under review of peers can change, as well. 
 
Moderator: Justice Koch, when a change in the law is being proposed, the 
side for whom change in the law is going to lead to an adverse consequence 
is going to argue the importance of stability and predictability. How do you 
tackle that argument when considering making a change in the common 
law? 
 
Justice Koch: I would say first, once the threshold, the tipping point, is 
reached where we think a change is necessary, then the issue becomes, “Is 
the change going to be prospective or retrospective?” That is a very 
complicated discussion. There are strong arguments on both sides. At least 
in my experience as an appellate judge, and certainly as a judge on the 
Tennessee Supreme Court, if we have decided that the change is necessary, 
we do examine what reliance interest the parties have on the existing rule of 
law. If it is important enough to make the change, I would say we typically 
find that it is going to apply to those people who relied on the rule of law as 
well. If equitable adjustments need to be made, we make them in how it is 
going to be enforced. 
 
Moderator: Justice Clark, if an attorney walking into court has an 
established common law rule against her, what does she need to do to move 
the Court in the direction of adopting a new rule? Should there be a 50-state 
study? Should we have sociological evidence? 
 
Justice Clark: Yes. [Laughter.] That is the short answer. Any or all of 
those things can help. And again, it is case specific. To use a term which 
may be a term of art—and I may be using it out of context—showing that 
there has been a change of circumstances is going to be helpful. It may be 
by showing the changed approach is trending in other states and the tipping 
point has been reached. Showing that many States are moving in a direction 
different from where this court has been is helpful. Showing that there has 
been a change in fact, or a change in technology can also be significant. For 
instance, during the time I was a trial judge, the admissibility of DNA 
evidence changed dramatically because the technology involved in testing 
and mapping DNA changed dramatically. So, it helps for the lawyer to be 
able to say, “I understand where you are. I understand in whatever case you 
last wrote, why you articulated why this is the rule. Here is what has 
changed.” And whether it is other states’ cases, or the science, or whatever 
                                                 
 6. 226 S.W.3d 287, 300 (Tenn. 2007). 
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it is, that is going to help give us the most direct way out. This approach 
gives us an opportunity to say, “We have had this rule for twenty years, or 
fifty years, or whatever, but the day has come when there is a good reason 
for us to make a change.” 
 
Moderator: Judge Daughtrey, is there anything in particular you would 
want to see in a brief or hear from an attorney trying to convince the Court 
to move in another direction? 
 
Judge Daughtrey: It may be that you have to be a little careful about 
choosing the case. I am always reminded that when the United States 
Supreme Court was faced with Mapp v. Ohio7 in 1961, the case that they 
chose to incorporate the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was not a 
case where a murder conviction was going to be thrown out. Police Officers 
entered Dollree Mapp’s house without a warrant and seized a trunk that had 
something largely innocuous in it. All that was at stake was contraband 
consisting of some nude sketches and a few books. It may be that you have 
to pick the right case.  
 
I think the other thing that has not been mentioned here today is the need, if 
you are about to undertake a major change in the law, to have, if at all 
possible, a unanimous Court behind it. That is what gave us some pause in 
the McIntyre case. There was pretty much a consensus that the law had to 
be changed, but the question was how far we should go, and what the 
ramifications were. It is very hard when you are making a change to try and 
envision everything that may be affected by it, but it is a good exercise to 
try and go through. And then to bring everybody on the Court in is also a 
very good idea. I do not think I am talking out school or out of chambers or 
out of the robing room when I say that there was a lot of effort that went 
into that, to get to the end result. There was compromise. There was at least 
one judge who did not want to go as far as the rest of us did, and it showed 
up in the final opinion. But I think when we were done, it was some really 
solid progress. Compare that to these wild split opinions that you get out of 
the United States Supreme Court. Sometimes there are changes in the law 
where there are plurality opinions, and you have to futz through all these 
opinions trying to figure out if there are as many as five people who agree 
on any one point. It seems to me that is not a particularly good way to do it. 
 
Moderator: Justice Koch, let’s take a closer look at the United States 
Supreme Court and constitutional interpretation with regard to stability and 
change. Justice Clarence Thomas is strongly arguing that the Court puts too 
much emphasis on stare decisis in constitutional interpretation and that in 
fact, in constitutional interpretation, stare decisis should play a much lesser 
                                                 
 7. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
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role.8 Critics say that undermines the integrity of the Court and leads to 
haphazard decisions and inconsistency. What are your thoughts on 
balancing stare decisis with stability and change in constitutional 
interpretation? 
 
Justice Koch: I think stare decisis not only produces predictability and 
stability, but in my mind, it also is a safeguard against judges with agendas. 
As a common-law judge, I know that on many of the cases I sit on, 
sufficient legal principles are available to enable me to decide the case in 
just about any way I want to. Of course, I have to bring my colleagues 
around to that particular point of view. On our court, I have to count to 
three. On the United States Supreme Court, you have to count to five. Stare 
decisis forces a judge who thinks that the law needs to be changed to get 
over a much higher hurdle. The burden of proof is heavier. And it should be 
heavier. If we start with the assumption that the concrete is not hardened on 
any of the cases that have been decided, we are going to start revisiting 
issues depending on which way the prevailing wind is blowing. And that is 
a concern. I have great respect and regard for Justice Thomas, but I am not 
sure I am ready to throw stare decisis off the island quite yet. 
 
Justice Clark: I think I agree with that. As a trial judge, one of the first 
things I was taught at every judicial conference was that consistency, 
stability, and predictability are what lawyers really value most in judges, at 
any level. Whatever your bent is, if people can be certain you are going to 
be consistently liberal or consistently conservative—use any word you want 
to—then they can at least prepare and give their clients good advice. So I 
take that seriously. I think that stare decisis is important. A case will come 
along that almost requires you to relook at whatever the underlying 
principle is, but I think that should be done cautiously. 
 
Judge Daughtrey: I am just a little shocked at Justice Thomas, and that is 
about all I have to say. 
 
Moderator: Judge Daughtrey, during your time serving on the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, the Court took a number of strong stands separating 
Tennessee constitutional law from federal constitutional law, in terms of 
providing greater, heightened protections under the state Constitution than 
were provided under the federal Constitution at the time. When you are 
looking at a similar provision—say, a search and seizure protection under 
the state Constitution and the federal Constitution—what leads you in the 
direction of legal reform as a judge in finding that greater protection in the 
state Constitution? 
                                                 
 8. See KEN FOSKETT, JUDGING THOMAS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF CLARENCE THOMAS 
281-82 (2005); McDonald v. City of Chi., Ill. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3058–88 (2010) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
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Judge Daughtrey: We came onto the Supreme Court at a time when the 
state constitutional movement was really getting traction. There was a 
period during the 1980s when a lot of the state supreme courts were 
beginning to look at their own constitutions and realize their allegiance to 
the state Constitution, as long as there was not any sort of conflict with the 
federal Constitution. The movement was ongoing at that time. It turns out 
that a couple of the members of the previous Supreme Court—I am 
speaking now of Justice Joe Henry and at least one of his colleagues—
thought that the state Constitution was worth looking to and did what they 
could to get the Court to think in those terms. And unfortunately there were 
only two votes on that question. 
 
So when it came to us, we were ready to do a little looking at that subject. It 
turns out that the Tennessee Constitution was patterned after the 
Connecticut Constitution, which actually predated the United States 
Constitution. So there is something to be said for the fact that we do not 
have to track along after the provisions in the United States Constitution, 
especially when the language is different. And there are some important 
differences. The Free Press provision of the state Constitution, for example, 
is different, really dramatically different, from the wording in the United 
States Constitution.9 So, there is a rich field there to mine, and we started it. 
And I think it was indeed the right way to go at the time. 
 
Moderator: Justice Clark, there are complaints that have been raised by 
State Supreme Court Justices in a number of states in terms of inadequacy 
of briefing on state constitutional issues, that essentially what you see is a 
citation to the Fourth Amendment, semi-colon, state Constitution. Many 
briefs do not go beyond that. If a lawyer wanted to come forward and put 
forth a meaningful argument to the Court that the Tennessee Constitution 
provides greater protection, what kind of arguments do you want to see that 
attorney marshal? 
 
Justice Clark: First, the very best that they can marshal. It is surprising 
                                                 
 9. Article I, Section 19 of the Tennessee Constitution provides 
That the printing presses shall be free to every person to examine the 
proceedings of the Legislature; or of any branch or officer of the 
government, and no law shall ever be made to restrain the right thereof. 
The free communication of thoughts and opinions, is one of the 
invaluable rights of man, and every citizen may freely speak, write, and 
print on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty. But 
in prosecutions for the publication of papers investigating the official 
conduct of officers, or men in public capacity, the truth thereof may be 
given in evidence; and in all indictments for libel, the jury shall have a 
right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the court, 
as in other criminal cases. 
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sometimes that cases will get to our Court and the attorneys in their briefing 
really have not given careful thought to those nuances. Those nuances are 
important. If the language of the Tennessee Constitution differs from that of 
the United States Constitution, then clearly, we would like for lawyers to 
talk about why the difference may be meaningful, why it may lead us to a 
different interpretation. We are often going to start from the position that if 
the language is similar, even if not identical, it is at least helpful to review 
what the federal constitutional cases say. Then we may move to a different 
position, or we may not. Lawyers can be very effective or they can be very 
ineffective in their adherence to or failure to adhere to the basic idea that 
what we want to hear is the nuance. We know the general principles. We 
want them to focus on what is different, and why that gives support to the 
position they are taking. 
 
We also want, in more general ways, the lawyers to take the time to be sure 
that if they are making a Fifth Amendment argument to us that they are not 
citing Sixth Amendment cases and vice versa. We often see that. They find 
black letter principles, and they sound good, but when you really drill down 
to what the cases are about, they are deciding very different issues, and that 
makes them less helpful. 
 
Judge Daughtrey: Justice Clark, do you all send letters out before the 
arguments saying, “We would also like to see you address . . . ”? 
 
Justice Clark: Our internal operating procedures now suggest that if we 
have a particular issue we want to focus on, we put that in the grant order. 
Usually, a Rule 11 application is granted on all issues raised, unless we say 
otherwise, but then we say what we would particularly like them to address 
at oral argument. And anybody who does not understand that is the defining 
issue for us, then [Laughter.] they are not paying a lot of attention. You are 
laughing, but sometimes lawyers get to court and are still not arguing about 
that issue. 
 
Justice Koch: Justice Brennan probably started the new Federalist 
movement back in the 1970s when the majority on the Supreme Court 
changed. Justice Brennan wrote a series of articles suggesting that if 
lawyers wanted to further develop constitutional protections and individual 
liberties, they ought to look to state courts.10 Many people considered 
Justice Brennan to be a sore loser and that he was making this argument 
only because he was no longer commanding majorities. In fact, Justice 
                                                 
 10. See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of 
Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Jeffrey Omar Usman, The Game Is Afoot: 
Constitutionalizing the Right to Hunt and Fish in the Tennessee Constitution, 77 TENN. L. 
REV. 57, 98-99 (2009) (addressing Justice Brennan’s role in spurring new judicial 
federalism). 
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Brennan’s suggestion was entirely consistent with what the Founding 
Fathers had in mind. You will recall they did not set up a bunch of lower 
federal courts when they set up the Supreme Court. They believed that state 
courts would decide these issues, and they thought they were perfectly 
competent in doing that. 
 
Justice Brennan’s position perhaps deserves more deference than it has 
gotten in some quarters. But that being said, I think the dirty little secret is 
what state supreme courts had been doing. Up until the 1960s or 1970s, the 
state supreme courts had been riding the coattails of the United States 
Supreme Court. And so a lawyer would temerariously get up in front of the 
Court and say, “The Tennessee Constitution protects this right.” And the 
Court would write an opinion that would say essentially, “Our 
constitutional provision is virtually the same as the provision in the United 
States Constitution, and so we are just going to adopt the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation.” To me, that statement triggers stare decisis. When the 
1990s came along and there was some necessity to revisit those questions, 
one of the hurdles you had to get over was that a prior Tennessee Supreme 
Court had said our constitutional provision is virtually identical to the 
federal provision. So then you have to start digging into that. 
 
And just to be honest with you, the lawyers have been very little help.11 
Most of the arguments you make are going to be based on the history of the 
document, the constitutional principles that were embraced in 1796 when 
the fifty-five folks met up in Knoxville to draft our Constitution. Judge 
Daughtrey is exactly right, it is a cut and paste job from other constitutional 
principles from around the country. We have many lawyers who will say 
that our Constitution provides far broader protection than the federal 
Constitution. I would say, “OK, what is next?” And they say, “Well, we are 
going to move on to our next argument.” I sit up there thinking, “Where is 
the beef?” A difference in language is very helpful; that gives you room to 
talk. But some of the differences in language simply are so subtle that it can 
be very hard to construct an argument that there was an intention to do 
something different. Basically the quality of the arguments that the lawyers 
give us is going to influence the quality of the result. On constitutional 
questions, I would love to know the names of any lawyers who have run 
over to the archives at the University of Tennessee or up to North Carolina 
where some of our organic documents are kept and who have actually tried 
to read some of them to give us some better idea about what really might 
have been going on in 1796. 
 
                                                 
 11. See generally Jeffrey Omar Usman, Constitutional Constraints on Retroactive 
Civil Legislation: The Hollow Promises of the Federal Constitution and Unrealized 
Potential of State Constitutions, 14 NEV. L.J. 63, 78-83 (2013) (discussing the failure of 
attorneys to adequately respond to the opportunities presented by new judicial federalism). 
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Judge Daughtrey: In Washington, when I had my confirmation hearing, I 
got raked over the coals by a member of the Senate Judiciary Committee 
for some of the opinions the Court had written having to do with the death 
penalty under the Tennessee Constitution. I had not written any of them, but 
I was about to be crucified for my association—guilt by association. So I 
tried to explain that yes we did hold that, but we were looking, not at the 
federal Constitution but instead the Tennessee Constitution. The question 
was, “Why would you hold a crazy thing like that when the federal 
Constitution has never been interpreted that way?” And I would say, well, 
we did hold that, and we held that under the state Constitution which is, of 
course, not exactly the same as the federal Constitution. Finally, this 
Senator said, “You know, I think that is just an excuse. It looks to me like 
the provisions under both those Constitutions are the same.” And I said, 
“Well Senator, if you will look at Article 1, Section 1 of the Tennessee Bill 
of Rights, which originally was at the front of the Constitution and not at 
the back of it, it says that if the citizens of Tennessee become unhappy with 
their state government, they have a right to rebel and overthrow that 
government.” And I said, “I do not think there is a provision like that in the 
United States Constitution.” [Laughter.] And I rested my case. 
 
Moderator: I would like to go a little more in depth on some of the unique 
provisions of the Tennessee Constitution. 
 
Judge Daughtrey: Well, that is one. [Laughter.] 
 
Moderator: I am also curious about effective arguments that lawyers can 
make in pushing reform with some of the provisions that are in the 
Tennessee Constitution but not the United States Constitution. Assuming 
that you are not trying to justify your client’s rebellion against the state, but 
instead make use, perhaps, of the Open Courts Clause,12 Justice Koch, what 
wealth of material is available for lawyers if they want to make use of such 
a provision? 
 
Justice Koch: For those of you who would like to go on legal 
archaeological digs, you can trace many parts of our Constitution, including 
the Open Courts Provision, back to Magna Carta. There are centuries of 
discussions by the English courts, by early American courts, state and 
federal, about Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, of what it 
means and does not mean.13 So you have common law doctrines, you have 
historical papers, you have scholarly articles written by many academicians 
over the years, and books. The irony of it is that now, most of our research 
                                                 
 12. TENN. CONST. art. I, § 17. 
 13. See William C. Koch, Jr., Reopening Tennessee’s Open Courts Clause: A 
Historical Reconsideration of Article I, Section 17 of the Tennessee Constitution, 27 U. 
MEM. L. REV. 333 (1997), for Justice Koch’s in-depth analysis of the Open Courts Clause. 
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is done on Westlaw and Lexis. And the materials on Westlaw and Lexis 
only go back so far. So, for example, if the answer to your question might 
be in 3 Tennessee, you are not going to find that on Westlaw or Lexis. I 
have not gone up and looked, but I am hoping that the Belmont Law 
Library has a set of the Tennessee Reports. Many of these precedents are 
still valid, but they are not readily available electronically. Accordingly, 
you must do the research the old-fashioned way. And that means that you 
hope the library has it, and if the library does not, you are going to have to 
get it on loan, or you have to know somebody who will pull it out of the 
archives. Many of these very important documents and precedents are just 
not readily available because they are not in electronic format right now, 
and you just have to find them. 
 
Moderator: Justice Clark, the Court acts to reform not just through its 
judicial decisions but also through its rulemaking role and its supervision of 
the bar. Would you take the audience through how major innovations occur 
in terms of the Court’s rulemaking and its supervision of the bar? 
 
Justice Clark: Over the last forty or so years, the Tennessee Supreme 
Court has by rulemaking improved and raised the bar and the expectations 
about ethical conduct. The Court has made significant strides on a lot of 
other issues related to the administration of justice. The Court now has 
fifty-two rules. Some of them are very significant. There are rules that 
govern the entire ethical conduct of lawyers, the rules that you must follow 
and the rules that are to be followed if lawyer misconduct is reported. There 
are rules that govern the ethical conduct of judges. Those are very 
significant, and those are the rules that must be followed under the Board of 
Judicial Conduct, which is created by statute now and its members 
appointed by members of the Legislature.14 
 
The process differs, in many cases now, on issues such as Access to Justice, 
where the Court, following the lead of the Tennessee Bar Association and 
others, said there is something that we know and now we are going to really 
emphasize it. And what we know is that there are many, many Tennesseans 
who have legal problems but they do not have the resources to hire a 
lawyer. In the civil arena, there is no constitutional or statutory right to have 
an attorney appointed. But there are many adverse things that can happen to 
people that would not happen if they had legal advice. And so the Court 
lifts this up. It created a Commission, and it created a rule, because the 
Court believes in being transparent and saying, “Here is what we want to 
do, and here is how we want to accomplish it.” 
 
So in many situations, we start those things ourselves. In other situations, 
                                                 
 14. See generally Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-5-101 through Tenn. Code Ann. § 17-5-314. 
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the Tennessee Bar Association or another lawyer or law-related group may 
petition us. We have rules now that govern continuing legal education. We 
have rules that govern how a person is qualified to take the bar exam and to 
be admitted as a lawyer. In each of those, we have independent bodies that 
we appoint, and they oversee these rules. And often those are the people 
who propose to us changes in the rules. And they do that by filing a 
petition, by stating what they want to change, and by stating why they want 
to change the rule. 
 
Almost one hundred percent of the time, we will publish proposed rules for 
public comment. We do that on the front end without making any statement 
about whether we support any or all of it. We have a petition that has just 
been filed suggesting some significant changes to Rule 2115 concerning 
continuing legal education. We will discuss that in the next week or two. I 
predict that we will publish the petition for public comment, and we will 
encourage all lawyers to comment on it, to tell us what they like about it, to 
tell us what they do not like. The petitioning group has presented a 
statement of reasons why the changes are needed, and they may be asked to 
respond to comments on the back end. Those are the ways in which the 
administration of justice, the ways in which we do business when making 
changes by rule rather than case law. 
 
Moderator: Judge Daughtrey, when you were serving on the Tennessee 
Supreme Court, a number of these administrative extensions of the Court 
were created. How important are those administrative outlets for the Court 
to properly perform its function? 
 
Judge Daughtrey: Well, one of the interesting things about that is you get 
a commission going to come up with some rules or some procedures, and 
immediately what you get is really good interaction with the bar, with the 
lawyers who are on that commission. I think it may have been the 
commission of the rules of criminal procedure, but what I remember 
distinctly is there were meetings on Saturday mornings, early. I would go 
down to the Supreme Court building and make sure the door was open. 
There was no security at the time. You just unlocked it from the inside, and 
anybody who wanted to could come in. And I had to then rush upstairs and 
make an urn of coffee and bring the doughnuts, etc. And that is what we 
did; we did not have any staff to do that. As a matter of fact, you go far 
enough back and there was only an executive secretary at the Supreme 
Court and maybe one or two assistants. So there was no Administrative 
Office of the Courts to help us with that. If you were going to try to get 
something going in terms of the Commission on ADR, for example, if you 
were the judge that was thinking that something ought to be changed, or 
                                                 
 15. TENN. SUP. CT. R. 21. 
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added, or done, you had to be willing to show up on Saturday morning and 
make the coffee and bring the doughnuts. 
 
But the payoff was that we not only made progress, but the process also 
kept the members of the Court in a zone of reality because they were 
dealing with lawyers who were in court and who had suggestions for how 
things can be improved. And it is something I miss. There is not anything 
like that anymore. There are some committees in the various circuits—rules 
committees where the judges meet with the lawyers once a year, maybe—
but it does not have that sort of down-home, integrated sort of basis that the 
State Supreme Court rules committees had. 
 
Moderator: It sounds like there are a lot of opportunities for learning from 
the bar in creating and structuring rules and moving forward on that front. 
On the opposite end of the spectrum, how much of a role is there for the 
court in trying to persuade the bar so as to move the bar in a particular 
direction? 
 
Justice Koch: I am thinking of one effort, before Judge Daughtrey’s time, 
when the Court decided to unify the bar. That did not go well. As I recall, 
the Court issued the rule and then pulled it back about nine months later. A 
wise person named Abraham Lincoln said, not quite in the terms that I am 
going to say it, but there is an axiom that a leader without followers is just 
out for a walk. [Laughter.] There are going to be occasions when we are 
going to have to sell ideas rather than decree them. 
 
That is where these advisory commissions and ad hoc bodies with leaders 
of various bar groups can be very helpful in terms of having a very healthy 
give and take. We start out with one set of perceptions. The bar starts out 
with a different set. We find a meeting of the minds, and then when that 
rule goes out for comment, we have a number of advocates at the bar 
already because they have been involved in preparing it. 
 
I think a great example of that, perhaps, would be the revisions to Rule 9,16 
the disciplinary rules that were originally proposed by the bar. We 
substantially changed them. There was a period of time for discussion, but 
by the time we were ready to hear oral argument on those rules, the bar 
broke the different sections of the rules down and had individual members 
of the bar explaining publicly why they were a good idea. Part of the job is 
to understand that you can rule by decree, but sometimes it is going to be 
much easier to rule by consensus. 
 
                                                 
 16. Tenn. Sup. Ct. Rule 9. 
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Judge Daughtrey: Of course, over on our side, we have to deal with 
Congress. [Laughter.] 
 
Justice Koch: That was actually another thing I was going to mention, too. 
Everything we have talked about are matters that are entrusted to the 
Judicial Branch of government. And so whether it is the licensing of 
lawyers, the education of lawyers, the rules of procedure that the courts 
follow, these have traditionally been matters that have been viewed as the 
court’s prerogative. Now there have been instances historically in 
Tennessee and other states when the Legislature has passed laws that affect 
some of these things. And our Court, like other State Supreme Courts, has 
acquiesced in those laws because they fit comfortably in the direction of 
where our rules were going, and so there was no need to raise the specter of 
separation of powers. 
 
I think what we are seeing in this day and time, not just in Tennessee, but in 
other states and in the federal government, is that the issues of separation of 
powers are becoming very blurred. We have members of our General 
Assembly now who want to decide whether law school education ought to 
be two years or three years, they want to decide what the rules of criminal 
and civil procedure ought to say. It is going to present a very challenging 
period of our evolution here as the Judicial Branch, the Executive Branch, 
and the Legislative Branch to find a civil, professional way to approach 
these issues. But at the end of the day, our Constitution is really quite clear 
in Article 2, Sections 1 and 2, that we do recognize the separation of 
powers, and it is our job in a polite, civil, appropriate way to draw that line 
when that line has to be drawn.17 
 
Justice Clark: One other thing I want to say about rulemaking. I run into 
lawyers now who say, “I never got a chance to comment on X,” “I did not 
know that you were proposing changes,” or “I just read about it 
somewhere.” And I recognize that we are not a unified bar. We have more 
than twenty thousand people licensed to practice and practicing law in 
Tennessee now. And we do not have a magic pushbutton where the 
Supreme Court can send out an email or a letter automatically to 
everybody, though some of our entities do. But I think today there is more 
opportunity to know what is going on and comment than there has ever 
been, because so much is done electronically. So every single proposed rule 
is put out for public comment. It is always posted on the website. You may 
submit comments back by the website, or by letter, or by any other method, 
and they can be easily circulated. We rely a great deal on bar associations, 
both local and state bar associations, and we are grateful to them for helping 
spread the word among their members. If you simply want to get up every 
                                                 
 17. See TENN. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2. 
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day and look on the website to see what is there, there is always going to be 
a reasonable chance to know about it and to comment on it. And that is a 
significant change from 1976 when the Board of Professional 
Responsibility was first created and even from the middle 1980s. 
 
Moderator: Judge Daughtrey, how should a Justice navigate these 
separation of powers concerns that are confronting the Court? 
 
Judge Daughtrey: Well, sometimes you just have to stick your neck out 
there and say, “This is ours to do and not yours.” And there are those 
opinions you can find. One of the things that the federal courts have tried to 
do is to come up with a system of contacting Congress to say, “When you 
passed this statute, you left some gaps. Here, for example, is an opinion that 
we wrote in this case, and if you look at it, you will see that we are having 
difficulty interpreting this terminology, or something was left out of the 
section on definitions, or there is an ambiguity here that we think you 
probably did not intend.” It is an interesting way to go about trying to get 
the message back to the Judiciary Committee or to the various committees 
that have oversight over these statutes, that maybe they should look at 
something. I know how that works, but I do not know the success rate, and I 
do not know what would happen if the Tennessee Supreme Court 
implemented a similar procedure with the General Assembly. I am just not 
sure how that would go. But that is a level of cooperation. Instead of 
saying, “You are just out of your element over there. That is ours to do and 
not yours.” There are ways in which courts can develop really good 
relationships with the Legislature, and they are very valuable. That is 
particularly common in the state courts. We do not get a lot of chance to 
deal with Congress, although we have people in Washington who do. 
 
Justice Clark: It should be easier in the state courts because you should 
know more of the people. I am somebody who believes that it is appropriate 
and perhaps even necessary to try to cultivate and maintain good and 
respectful relationships among the branches of government. The fact that 
we tiptoe up to this separation of powers issue—and there comes a point 
where each one of us may need to say, “You are overstepping. You are 
stepping over the line. You are usurping my authority”—does not mean that 
there should not be conversations. I look around and I know in this 
audience right now there are at least two former committee chairs from the 
Legislature that I have known and with whom I have worked. Both as AOC 
Director and for the two years I served as Chief Justice, I thought it was 
appropriate at the beginning of every session to go over and sit down with 
key committee chairs, talk about what they thought was going to come up, 
what we thought was going to come up, and to have conversations as 
needed in between. For the most part, those folks were always welcoming. 
That did not mean they always agreed, but they were willing to listen and to 
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engage in the discussion, and I think that’s important. To the extent that we 
are, or that we feel we are, losing that ability to have those good 
conversations, then I worry about it, because our government works best 
when we work together. 
 
Justice Koch: And here is an example, perhaps, of one of the more recent 
successes. You heard a presentation before lunch about tort reform. One of 
the parts of that legislation included a very interesting way to instruct the 
juries on how to calculate damages. And dare I say it would be impossible 
for a layperson or a lawyer to understand those instructions. And some of 
our trial judges took hold of that issue and realized that it was a problem 
after getting consensus with their colleagues that everyone shared a concern 
that this was perhaps not set up the way it should be, initiated discussions 
with the sponsors of the bill, and were able to get that provision adjusted. 
 
So those sorts of conversations work. Justice Clark is exactly right. 
Conversations with legislative leaders or individual legislators who take a 
particular interest in an issue can be helpful. My experience over the last 
forty years has been the judiciary is always ready to talk, explain, or listen 
to the input of members of the General Assembly and the Executive 
Branch. But I just have to be honest with you: There are a growing number 
of persons who have not served in government roles before they were 
elected to the Legislature. Without naming any of them, I can think of one 
that both Justice Clark and I made an appointment and went over to the 
office to talk about a particular issue, and the response was, “You are 
judges. Get out of here. It is unconstitutional for me to talk to you.” And so 
it is kind of hard to initiate the dialogue [Laughter.] until you have people 
working from the same point of view. 
 
So, of course, we do not rush over to talk to that legislator a lot. It is a 
gradual process of educating public servants, both judges and 
representatives of the Executive and Legislative Branches, that separation 
of powers does not equate to being hermetically sealed from each branch of 
government, that there are appropriate ways to do that. And what 
professionals need to do, whether we are professional judges or 
professional legislators, we need to find ways to do that, because it really 
does minimize the difficulties. 
 
Justice Clark: One thing I have come to understand while being on this 
Court is that most of the cases we hear do not deal with the constitutionality 
of legislative actions. We are not ruling anything unconstitutional; that 
happens very rarely. We are called upon under a specific set of facts to 
interpret a law. And sometimes we find out very literally that whether it has 
a comma or semicolon, an “and” or an “or,” can make a difference, and it 
may have been nothing more than a typographical error that leads to an 
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outcome that legislators who voted for it think is unusual. Sometimes, the 
language is different or, I can think of a case recently where we have had to 
say, “You have established a standard that governs this, but nobody ever 
thought factually about this second set of facts, and now we’re confronted 
with this second set of facts, so we have to interpret as best we can.” 
 
From our point of view, because we speak through our opinions, it is not 
personal. We understand that once we have said this is our best judgment 
about what you meant when you said this, if the Legislature disagrees, the 
next time they go into session they have an absolute right to change the 
language. I released another case recently that emphasizes just that.18 There 
was this statute, and our courts began interpreting it this way, and in 2004 
the Legislature changed that statute. They must have meant for us to go in a 
different direction. It is our obligation, under all those circumstances, to 
follow where they are leading us. 
 
And so we do not take it personally if they change the law in response to 
our interpretation because it may not be what they intended. But I 
sometimes run into people who do tend to take it personally if we have 
interpreted a statute in a way that they did not intend. That is not intended 
as a criticism. It is sometimes taken as a criticism, I think. 
 
Moderator: Judge Daughtrey, as part of this conversation both with the 
public and with the Legislature about legal reform, a pressing issue in 
Tennessee right now involves changes with regard to judicial selection. 
What is the role of the Court, in terms of speaking to those issues, and what 
is the role of judges in speaking out on what they believe to be the most 
appropriate method? 
 
Judge Daughtrey: Well, I could start off by saying something innocuous 
like, “I am the only person in the room, probably, who has been put on the 
bench by appointment, by retention election, by an open partisan election, 
and by, again, appointment in the end to a position that carries life tenure.” 
So I have seen it all. I got a little teed off the other morning when the 
Tennessean announced that only two women in history had been elected to 
statewide office. [Laughter.] 
 
Justice Clark: There are at least three of us sitting on the Supreme Court 
right now who thought we had. [Laughter.] 
 
Judge Daughtrey: And I did, too. Now, those two women, who were on 
the public safety commission, both were involved in, I think, contested 
elections. But the partisan election of the Supreme Court in 1990, we 
                                                 
 18. See Armbrister v. Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685 (Tenn. 2013). 
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thought running right up to the last minute that there were going to be 
nominees put up by the other party, and that we would have contested 
elections. It just so happened that in the end the Republicans did not put up 
a slate. And so we ran unopposed. But it does not mean I am not a statewide 
elected official. I have not called the editor yet to say anything about it, but 
I think I may in our defense before the week is over. 
 
You know, it has gotten really bad out there since the United States 
Supreme Court more or less did away with the rules that the judges had 
come up with and the lawyers had come up with about campaigns and 
financial contributions to campaigns. What is happening in some of the 
states in these open elections, even the non-partisan ones, is just shocking, 
actually. The negative ads on TV and the special interest groups coming in 
and offering to back candidates on the assumption that those judges are 
going to vote the way they want them to vote. That whole scene I find so 
troubling, so that whenever anybody starts talking about judges should be 
elected officials just like all other officials—the point is that judges do not 
represent anybody. It is not a political office that they are holding. And 
there has got to be a better way. 
 
So far, it seems to me that the better way is merit selection and retention. 
People say, “Well, there are politics in that process, too.” And sure there 
are, and we have seen it go back and forth here in Tennessee. And that 
process does not always produce the best person for the office. But what it 
does do for the most part, in my experience and in my opinion, is prevent 
people who are unqualified from getting on the bench, so that you have to 
come through enough screening that people who are just patently 
unqualified to sit as judges do not, in fact, end up getting the appointments. 
 
There are bugs in the system. I think we are about to experience some of the 
bugs in the system in Tennessee. Obviously, some of the provisions that are 
now in place need to be rethought, in my judgment. But I am looking at that 
now from the very enviable position of having life tenure, and it is a nice 
place to be. [Laughter.] And I would not trade it for almost anything or any 
other suggestion you could come up with. 
 
Moderator: There is dissatisfaction out there right now from consumers in 
the legal market, from corporations, from individuals, from people who are 
trying to access the judicial system. What is the role of the judiciary in 
trying to respond to those dissatisfied customers of the legal system, Justice 
Koch? 
 
Justice Koch: Well, I can only speak for myself, but I candidly have to 
say that the customers have a right to be dissatisfied. Here in the 21st 
century, we are delivering law about the same way we did in the 19th 
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century. And it is too expensive. It takes too much time. It is simply not 
efficient. I think all of us that are lawyers and judges are going to have to 
take a piece of that blame and figure out a way to fix it. 
 
Now the role of the courts—it gets back to “A leader without followers is 
just out for a walk”—I think that the courts need to be more candid in their 
recognition that we need to give litigants, both on the criminal and the civil 
side, quicker justice in an affordable way. We need to make sure that jury 
trials can be reasonably available to people with small cases, not just big 
cases. And we see a real significant disconnect in terms of how court is 
available to people in the state right now. For example, in Davidson 
County, if someone files for a divorce in November, Davidson County 
Circuit Court will give them a trial in February. You go out of Davidson 
County, not too far away from here, it is two years. This is something that 
we all have to collectively address. The Supreme Court certainly has 
adopted Access to Justice as its primary policy initiative. I am seeing this 
question as a subset of Access to Justice. I think it may be a matter of the 
court finding followers and leading those followers into some structural 
changes in how we do business. 
 
Moderator: Justice Clark? 
 
Justice Clark: Well, I agree with all of that. It is both simple and very 
difficult. We need to deliver quality service, faster and less expensively. If 
ninety percent of success is just showing up, I am going to suggest to you 
that most of the judges I know do that. They come to work on time every 
day. They open their courts as they are scheduled. Many of them stay late. 
They have read briefs before motion days. They listen carefully. And they 
are prepared to rule at the conclusion of proceedings or very soon 
thereafter. 
 
Those people do not get any attention, and the people who get the attention 
are the ones who do not quite do that. They do not show up every day, or 
they do not schedule court as many days as they should, or perhaps they 
come unprepared to listen to the proceedings, whether it is trial or appellate. 
It is a privilege to have the jobs that we have. And I, too, have been 
appointed, and I have been through a partisan election, and I have won a 
retention election. But however you got here and are permitted to stay here, 
it is a privilege every day. 
 
And I understand that with that privilege comes the responsibility to do 
justice. The Tennessee Supreme Court has addressed that by internally 
adopting procedures that say you must circulate your opinions within a 
certain period of time. And if, ultimately, there is time to discuss and decide 
if there is going to be a dissent, then you must circulate that within the 
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period of time because timeliness often is justice. Taking too much time, 
sometimes, denies justice. We have to require trial courts to do that. We 
have to require general sessions courts to do that. The Chief Justice is 
taking on more responsibility and looking around the state at post-
conviction cases and certain other kinds of cases that are taking longer than 
they should, having conversations with judges. We are more actively using 
our senior judges now and sending them out into the communities to handle 
dockets of judges who are sick, or who may have retired or resigned and 
their cases are not coming along. But all of us together have to do whatever 
it takes to be sure that cases can be heard timely, that, whether you show up 
with or without any attorney, you are going to at least get a chance to 
present your point of view and your case. We have to prevent the few 
lawyers who try to take advantage of others or who try to abuse the 
discovery process. Those things are easy to say and hard to live, but if we 
are going to have any hope of providing access to justice, each of us is 
responsible for that every single day. 
 
Moderator: Judge Daughtrey? 
 
Judge Daughtrey: I know there are some controversies out there. We 
could probably get a good little debate going in this room right now. I am 
hearing trial lawyers saying that there is too much summary judgment and 
there are not enough cases going to trial. You know, as somebody who 
reviews those summary judgment orders, I have to say those of you that are 
strong on trial should come sit in my seat and see how pitiful some cases 
that are filed are, and how little they need a trial, and how lucky we are to 
have the availability of summary judgment in many cases. 
 
It also seems to me that the movement to take some of the legal work out of 
the courts has been successful. Maybe in some instances there has been too 
much. When we ran for the Tennessee Supreme Court in 1990, we were 
going all over the state trying to get support. One of the other judges who 
was running, and who actually was on the Court of Appeals at the time, ran 
into me in Nashville and said, “I am talking to some of the people you have 
talked to after you have talked to them, and what I need to know is: What is 
this thing called ADR?” [Laughter.] Now, that is where we were in 1990: 
There were people out there who had never heard the phrase “ADR.” We 
have gotten into it. We have a commission on ADR now, and that was one 
of my campaign principles. 
 
So, it seems to me there are ways to deal with this. The federal courts are in 
trouble because there simply are not enough judges, and we have to depend 
on Congress to create them. And there is a lack of flexibility with these 
Article III judges. We have a huge number of District Court judges in 
Detroit right now with not much to do other than bankruptcy. It would be 
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extremely useful, for example, if those judges could somehow be assigned 
to other districts. It just apparently cannot be done. Then there are judicial 
emergencies, and what we have got is Congress stalling, so that you could 
go two or three years from the time you are nominated to become a federal 
judge to the time you finally get confirmed, or you have to walk away. You 
all might be interested in what is going on in Congress right now. There is 
the argument that they do not need to fill vacancies on the D.C. Circuit 
because the statistics show that those judges do not have a full caseload as 
compared to the judges down in Florida who have a million drug cases. 
What the judges in the D.C. Circuit do have is the venue for the filing of all 
the administrative cases in this country. So it is not an assembly line of drug 
cases; they have big cases that take a long time to deal with. 
 
I do not have all the answers. But I do think we have to stay flexible, and 
invite the innovators in to give us some ideas, and not be set in our ways. I 
was invited to a seminar one time, a program on looking into the future. I 
think it was called “Looking Over the Rim: 2020.” Of course, 2020 
sounded like 1984 used to sound when some of us were young. And here it 
is, almost 2020! In any event, it was thirty years away at that point, and the 
question was: “What do we need to think about for the courts at that time?” 
There was a judge from some place, I think it was Chesterfield County, 
Virginia, who said, “You know, if Patrick Henry came back today and went 
to the county seat of Chesterfield County, and if he went down the street he 
would be amazed at the changes. I mean, there is no livery person any 
more; there is a car dealership. There is no alchemy shop any more; there is 
this incredible drug store that is not just drugs but everything else you can 
think of.” And he went on and on, and finally he got down to the 
courthouse and he said, “Patrick Henry would walk into the courthouse and, 
‘Blimey! It’s exactly the way it was!’ [Laughter.] They are keeping the 
books and doing the same things they have been doing all that time.” 
 
Well, I am going to bet that that courthouse now has electronic filing, so in 
that sense we have made a little progress. But the law is often thought of as 
being hidebound. It does behoove us in terms of your theme here, reform, to 
remember that we do need to be flexible enough to make some changes 
when changes are necessary. 
 
Moderator: Our panelists have been extraordinarily generous in sharing 
their time. Please join me in thanking them for giving so generously of their 
time this afternoon. [Applause.] 
 
